Predominant literature surrounding temporary labor migration associates decision-making processes to institutions in migrant-hosting states, primarily in the Persian Gulf where the kafala system stands as the most notorious of migration regimes. Amendments or reforms to these policies are commonly explained by “black box” politics, implying that changes to kafala are privy to the preferences of select Gulf rulers, despite the existence of regional forums such as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue that regularly bring migrant-receiving and migrant-sending states together in policymaking efforts. Current theories also fail to consider the sovereign actions of migrant-sending states in reforming immigration and labor laws for their emigrant populations. But to what extent do these states advocate for better governance for their workers abroad? This chapter constructs a theoretical framework that illustrates the conditions in which sending states advocate for, refuse to, or are reluctant in engaging in labor reform for their expatriate workforce in the Persian Gulf. I argue that sending states act strategically when it comes to advocating for migrant workers’ wellbeing and such decisions are contigent upon the value of remittances accrued, preferences of domestic state actors in both the public and private spheres, and international reputational costs, the latter of which may jeopardize potential investments in the future. These conditions are illustrated through a case analysis of Bangladeshi state agencies, their roles, and policies towards migrant workers in the Persian Gulf. The findings in this paper contribute to growing research on the agency of migrant-sending states and how their preferences shape labor migration in authoritarian states in the Global South.

Efforts aimed at energy and environmental security are characterized by conditions of coupled, strategic interactions between the United States and China; the two countries cooperate in the development and deployment of some energy sources while competing in others. These interactions introduce both benefits and costs to both countries, as well as to countries that depend on the United States and China for trade, to the global energy market, and to international efforts to mitigate climate change. The transition to clean energy sources provides benefits to third parties—in addition to the country that is investing in those resources—through reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases. Efforts to decarbonize at the national level result in climate benefits that extend beyond sovereign borders. Thus, the interests of the United States and of China to commercialize nuclear, solar, wind, and other alternative energy sources through bilateral strategic interactions in pursuit of their respective net-zero carbon emissions targets can contribute to energy and environmental security worldwide. In this chapter, I address energy and environmental security as forums for competition and cooperation between the United States and China. The aim is to better understand the challenges that the United States will face to ensure that its economy meets the nation’s needs.

While some states in the Middle East and North Africa have pursued renewable energy policies, others have doubled-down on conventional fossil fuels and eschewed the development of alternative energy. What explains this variation? What implications do these choices have on domestic and international politics? Drawing on theories from political science and the political economy of development, this chapter explores the transition from conventional to alternative energy in the MENA region. Early work emphasized a “rentier social contract” whereby the state provides goods and services financed by fossil energy rents instead of citizen taxes, in exchange for constituent support for state autonomy in policymaking. This laid the scholarly foundation for the natural resource “curse,” such that these rents account for the region’s maladies, from authoritarianism and weak state capacity to unemployment and economic stagnation. In challenging this curse, recent work instead posits that institutions—such as state-owned enterprises (SOEs), bureaucracies, and legal regimes—explain different governance outcomes and variation in energy policy. This chapter examines the political implications of these theoretical perspectives for alternative energy in the MENA. First, it considers the impact of decarbonized, diversified economies on demands for inclusive governance and democratic institutions. Second, the chapter asks if and how alternative energy will provide the means to “escape the curse” of fossil fuel wealth, focusing on aspects of the curse such as unemployment, fiscal balances, and regime stability. The chapter concludes with theoretically-informed explanations for the variation in alternative energy policies in the MENA, and potential scenarios for how the transition will affect fiscal and political stability.